Who’s Ahead In Environmental Protection:
The United States or the European Union?

O

ur debate on “Who’s Ahead?”
is set in an era when Europe is
expanding both in geography
and regulation. A highly touted recent
example of the latter is the EU’s nascent
REACH chemical registration and evaluation program, which would address
chemicals that have been on the market
for years, as well as new chemicals and
signiﬁcant new uses. But only 10 or 15
years ago, from the U.S. vantage, European national environmental laws were
often seen as modeled after the United
States’, but not as advanced, especially
in implementation. The United States
had also developed a sophisticated
risk-based approach while Europeans
used a simpler precautionary model.
During a decade or more in which
Congress has all but stopped environmental lawmaking, however, European
nations have completed their coalescence into the European Union and
enacted some of the most stringent and
innovative environmental regulatory
programs in the world. The precau4 6
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tionary model is seen as an integral
part of that success. And then, there’s
climate change, where the EU member
states were not only early ratiﬁers of
the Kyoto Protocol but have developed
a continental emissions trading scheme
as well.
But there’s another side, too. The
United States’ risk-based system
evolved because precaution didn’t allow a strong enough role for science in
decisionmaking, some would argue,
and thus made government interference in the market seem arbitrary and
unjustiﬁed. While Congress may have
been largely silent in lawmaking, the
agencies have been busy in numerous
areas. And then there are the advantages of the federalism and marketbased approaches that highlight U.S.
policy today.
Unfortunately, invitations extended
to the U.S. government to participate
were declined at the Environmental
Protection Agency and the White House
Council on Environmental Quality.
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“The well-developed
use in the U.S. of
administrative law and
cooperative federalism
provide the framework
for the appropriate
balance between risk
management and
precaution.“
Michael S. Caplan

“At the Earth Summit,
the U.S. shifted course
on environment, giving
priority to economic and
trade issues, followed
by regulatory rollbacks.
Since then, Europe has
developed stronger
policies at both the
national and EU levels.”
Robert Donkers

Attorney
Environmental Department
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP

Environment Counselor
Delegation of the European Commission
to the United States

“The REACH proposal
in the European Union
shifts the burden
of proof, requiring
manufacturers to
provide health and
safety information and
providing incentives for
the industry to switch
to safer alternatives.”
Meghan Purvis

Environmental Health Advocate
U.S. Public Interest Research Group

“There is a wide range in

“The real pattern is
not the precautionary

performance among the
EU member states.... In
the southern countries
and the areas formerly
under Soviet control,
many environmental
requirements are either
not in place or are
not being enforced
aggressively.”
Ernie Rosenberg

President and CEO
Soap and Detergent Association

principle, but
precautionary
particularity. The
interesting question
is not who is ‘ahead,’
but why the U.S. and
EU sometimes select
different risks to worry
most about.”
Jonathan B. Wiener

Perkins Professor of Law and
Environmental Policy
Duke University

MARCH/APRIL 2006

❖

47

Copyright © 2006, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org. Reprinted by permission from The Environmental Forum®, March/April 2006

T H E

U.S.: Realistic
Balance Of Risk
And Precaution
MICHAEL S. CAPLAN

W

aiving high the ﬂag of the
precautionary principle,
the European Union
asserts it is now more innovative than the United States in its
environmental management. But
when asking “Who’s Ahead?”,
we ought not buy into the notion
that “ahead” is measured by the
most ambitious system. Rather,
the system that is ahead should be
measured by the reality of environmental protection identiﬁed at
the ground level.
The reality is that the United
States has a proven track record of
environmental accomplishments
and maintains certain advantages
over the comparable EU system.
The U.S. chronological lead in
environmental management has
allowed it to develop expert administrative agencies and imbue
such agencies with the authority to
interpret and implement environmental statutes. This provides the
U.S. with the ability to adapt more
quickly without having to create
entire new statutory regimes when
new pollution concerns develop.
Moreover, the long-standing system of federalism in the U.S. creates a system of partnership, with
the states and federal government
working together to form a comprehensive environmental regime.
With its industrial base virtually
untouched after World War II, the
U.S. was faced with modern-era
environmental problems prior to
the EU. Public outcry regarding
pollution, such as Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring, forced the U.S. to
address environmental problems
decades earlier than its European
counterparts. U.S. environmental
statutes have been tested and revised over the decades not only by
the three branches of the federal
government, but also by the states
4 8
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and the public through citizen
suits. The authority granted to administrative agencies to interpret
environmental statutes, reinforced
by the Supreme Court’s Chevron
decision, has led to a process of
ﬁne-tuning and the evolution of
a realistic, efﬁcient, and ﬂexible
method of regulation.
In contrast, the EU environmental management system is in its
infancy. The EU Liability Directive
for environmental damage does
not enter into force until 2007. The
EU Registration, Evaluation and
Authorization of Chemicals, or
REACH, initiative remains simply
a proposal. Moreover, the recent,
derived nature of European federalism generates constant tension
between member states and the
multinational governmental institutions. The U.S. constitutional
system of federalism, on the other
hand, recognizes that states are a
partner in administering environmental laws because harms are
often best addressed at the local
level.
An illustrative example of
the differences between the two
regimes is the manner in which
they each regulate chemicals. The
U.S. maintains a layered system
of protection from the potential
harms that chemicals may cause.
The centerpiece of the U.S. chemical policy is the Toxic Substances
Control Act. Enacted in 1976,
TSCA provides broad powers to
EPA to regulate chemicals which
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment
and to take action with respect to
substances which are imminent
hazards. Through administrative
law and a risk reduction strategy,
EPA has allowed low risk chemicals onto the market in controlled
and limited situations while additional data is developed. TSCA
is buttressed by additional federal
regulatory systems for particular
chemicals, such as pesticides or
drugs. State tort laws complement TSCA by subjecting hazardous chemicals to product liability
lawsuits. These overlapping legal
mechanisms provide an effective
full-court defense to potential
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harmful chemicals.
The EU chemical proposal,
REACH, shifts the burden on
companies to ensure the safety of
chemicals. REACH’s over reliance
on precaution will preclude some
beneﬁcial chemicals from making
it to market without adequate science to support such prohibition.
Nightmarish bureaucratic paperwork and heavy costs imposed on
businesses for testing, documenting, and recordkeeping will stiﬂe
many new developments. The lack
of clarity regarding REACH’s risk
standards will cause the misallocation of resources on less harmful
chemicals. The absence of a welldeveloped administrative agency
will result in inconsistency in
REACH’s implementation among
regulated companies. Although
the proposed program contains
ambitious legislative declarations,
one must remain skeptical and
wait for implementation. Under
the current proposal, it appears
that REACH has practical problems which will take years to cure.
The 21st century brings new
technologies and new pollution
concerns. Although it can be
tempting to ban something outright in the name of precaution, as
Chief Justice Warren Burger aptly
noted, “Perfect safety is a chimera;
regulation must not strangle human activity in the search for the
impossible.” The well-developed
use in the U.S. of administrative
law and cooperative federalism
provides the framework for the
appropriate balance between risk
management and precaution.
This balance makes the U.S. better
equipped to address new pollution
concerns and to continue to lead
the world in realistic environmental management.
Michael S. Caplan is an attorney
in the Environmental Department of
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. He is
an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown
University Law Center, where he
teaches a course comparing regulation
of chemicals, biotech, and nanotech in
the U.S. and EU. He can be reached at
mcaplan@willkie.com.
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U.S. Changed
Course, And EU
Surged Forward
ROBERT DONKERS

F

irst, we need to get rid of
a few over-simpliﬁcations
— namely that Europe regulates while the United States relies
on market forces, and that the EU
applies precaution where the U.S.
relies on risk assessments.
Europe’s regulatory approach is
sometimes regarded as top-down,
command-and-control, inﬂexible,
and lacking transparency, but this
is not correct. The 25 EU member
states are not easily commanded
by Brussels! However, once common EU standards are adopted,
they apply across the EU, which
provides transparency and a level
playing ﬁeld. Furthermore, the European Commission engages more
and more in open dialogue, involving stakeholders and providing extended (economic) impact
assessments with its proposals.
The worldwide internet consultation on the proposal for REACH,
the new EU chemicals policy and
legislation, is one example.
Also, the EU is increasingly
using market-based instruments
(such as the Emission Trading
Scheme for CO2 allowances), as
well as voluntary schemes, information, and awareness-raising, in
a policy mix with regulation. Just
as the U.S. environmental toolkit
does not just contain litigation and
voluntary initiatives, the European
toolkit does not just contain legislation.
Finally, the EU’s use of the
Precautionary Principle is also a
subject of misunderstanding. The
Precautionary Principle is a tool
available to decisionmakers when
faced with potentially harmful and
irreversible effects on the environment or health and when there is
no full scientiﬁc certainty concerning the nature or extent of the risk.
The Precautionary Principle is not
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a substitute or excuse for seeking
zero risk, and its application is
ﬁrmly based on risk assessments
and available scientiﬁc information. It is carefully used and on a
case by case basis.
Where are we today? From
the 1970s to the beginning of the
1990s, the U.S. was widely recognized as a world leader on environmental issues. Domestically,
it developed a robust environment policy including standards.
Some policy elements and many
standards were followed abroad,
including in Europe. The U.S.
pursued a strong enforcement
policy. And the U.S. was a strong
proponent of international action
to protect the environment and
played an important role in leading the world to agree to the 1987
Montreal Protocol to protect the
ozone layer.
In the 1970s, the European
environment policy was just starting, with its ﬁrst multi-year action
program (presented in 1973) and
with mainly ad hoc measures on
water pollution, waste issues, and
car emissions.
Things changed. At the Earth
Summit in June 1992, the U.S.
shifted course on environment
initiatives, giving priority to economic and trade issues, followed
by initiatives to roll back legislation domestically.
But in Europe, with increasing
environment problems, recognition of environment NGOs, and
with Green political parties coming up (in for example Germany),
a stronger environment policy
developed at both the national
and European levels, carefully
integrated and coordinated with
other policies, such as industry,
energy, transport, trade, and social
policies. Nowadays, EU policy
elements including product and
emission standards, for instance
on car emissions, are being introduced in many non-EU countries.
What are possible reasons for
those different evolutions in policy? It would take too long to detail
the reasons for differences, but a
few should be brieﬂy mentioned.
Europe ﬁrmly believes that only a

multilateral approach is effective
in addressing problems such as
climate change and global environmental degradation. Thus, the
EU promotes strong international
agreements and delivers on them.
Europeans are more skeptical
than Americans that technological
advance through market forces
will solve our environmental problems. The EU shares the view that
technology is a key tool to ﬁnd
solutions, but a regulatory framework is needed to trigger the technology in time.
Cultural and demographic
dimensions may also play a role.
The EU 25 has 460 million inhabitants and the U.S. has 300 million
on twice the land mass. There are
many more people per square mile
in Europe. Environment problems
are felt everywhere and trigger
cross-boundary action.
The U.S. is still ahead of Europe
in applying market based instruments, but the EU is catching up.
The U.S. has more experience with
enforcing federal legislation than
in the comparable EU-level situation, where only recently have
ﬁnancial penalties been added to
existing legal instruments. But
today, many EU standards are
regularly becoming global standards. Concerning international
leadership on environment issues,
the EU has clearly ﬁlled the gap
the U.S. has voluntarily left.
At the end of the day, it is not
very relevant from an environment perspective who is ahead on
one issue or the other. Only when
the U.S. and the EU, the world’s
largest economies, work together
can we tackle the very complex
challenges — from climate change
to adequate clean drinking water
— the world is facing.
Robert Donkers is Environment
Counselor at the Delegation of the
European Commission to the United
States in Washington, D.C.
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EU: Burden Of
Proof Shifted To
Chemical Maker
MEGHAN PURVIS

W

hen it comes to protecting public health from
toxic chemicals, the
European Union has trumped the
United States. Take chemicals as
an example, my area of expertise.
Many point to the differences of
our basic regulations for toxic
chemicals — the United States’
risk-based approach versus the
European Union’s blossoming
precautionary focus. All of this
is certainly true, but the failure
of U.S. chemicals policy goes far
beyond risk versus precaution.
The Toxic Substances Control
Act is fundamentally ﬂawed in
three ways: First, for the chemicals
on the market before TSCA passed,
EPA assumes they are safe unless
proven otherwise. According to
the Government Accountability
Ofﬁce, EPA has crumbled under
this burden of proving negative
health effects. EPA has evaluated fewer than 200 of the 62,000
chemicals that were on the market
when TSCA passed, and regulated
only ﬁve.
Second, TSCA manages rather
than prevents health risks, even
when there’s credible evidence
that harm may occur from exposure to a chemical. When regulators are forced to assess risk, they
often spend years guesstimating
the relative odds that a chemical’s
toxicity combined with the average person’s exposure levels will
cause harm. The regulators then
attempt to keep the risk to an “acceptable” level.
In reality, this is nearly an impossible task. New information
about low-dose exposures, as well
as unknown impacts of additive
exposures, makes estimating and
calculating an average exposure
to one chemical rather pointless.
Rather than managing risk, regula5 0
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tors should assess chemicals based
on their known hazardous properties, such as their persistence in
our bodies or carcinogenicity, and
phase out the most problematic
chemicals for less hazardous alternatives.
Finally, the monetary burden of
assessing chemical safety falls on
taxpayers, not chemical companies. Since EPA has to meet a high
burden of proof to label a chemical hazardous, the agency has to
spend hundreds of thousands of
taxpayer dollars on testing and
analysis. In its 1998 review of high
production volume chemicals, EPA
estimated the cost for a full round
of basic screening tests, including tests for reproductive and
developmental toxicity, at about
$205,000 per chemical. The chemical industry, which reports proﬁts
of about $17 billion per year and
beneﬁts ﬁnancially from the chemicals on the market, should pay
this price to protect public health.
The REACH proposal in the
European Union shifts this burden, requiring manufacturers to
provide health and safety information and providing incentives
for the industry to switch to safer
alternatives.
In the United States, stop-gap
voluntary agreements between
industry and regulators dominate federal action on chemicals
— proving that U.S. toxics policy
is broken. Most recently, EPA
reached a voluntary agreement
with DuPont and other companies
to virtually eliminate PFOA, a byproduct of non-stick coatings such
as Teﬂon, by 2015. A few weeks
later, EPA’s science advisory board
recommended that PFOA be considered a likely carcinogen. Under
U.S. law, however, EPA is not required to act on this information.
Instead, the victims of PFOA must
hope that DuPont, the same company that was ﬁned $16.5 million
for hiding damning information
about its proﬁtable chemical, keep
its word.
This voluntary tactic also fails
to take a systematic approach to
chemicals management, allowing companies to shift from one
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problematic chemical to another.
The U.S. government’s failure to
take action on another class of
chemicals, phthalates, provides a
clear example. Phthalates are plasticizers that have been linked to
developmental and reproductive
defects. In response to a petition
from environmental and consumer
groups, the U.S. government asked
toy manufacturers to voluntarily
remove DINP, one type of phthalate, from children’s teethers and
other mouthing toys. In 2005, U.S.
PIRG tested several soft plastic
baby toys and teethers; we found
that while none contained DINP,
many contained other phthalates,
including three that have been
banned in all toys and childcare
articles in the European Union.
This calls into question not only
the utility of voluntary industry
agreements but the efﬁcacy of
a one-chemical-at-a-time toxics
policy.
Not everyone in the U.S. government is content with a broken
regulatory scheme. Last summer,
public health-conscious members
of Congress introduced the Kids
Safe Chemicals Act. This legislation would reform TSCA and
establish a regulatory system that
requires chemicals to be proven
safe before they are put on the
market. Americans deserve nothing less.
Meghan Purvis is an Environmental Health Advocate with U.S. Public
Interest Research Group in Washington, D.C.
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EU’s Aspiration
Trumped By U.S.
Implementation
ERNIE ROSENBERG

C

omparing environmental
protection in the European
Union and the United States
is not straightforward. There are
aspects of environmental protection laws that are superior in
the United States and aspects of
European law that are superior
as written, though often not as
implemented. On balance, the U.S.
system is designed to deliver better results more reliably.
In discussing this issue, we
need to address two types of environmental laws, pollution control
(air and water pollution and waste
management) and materials management.
In pollution control, there is a
wide range in the performance of
the various member states of the
European Union. The EU uses two
types of instruments for its laws
in this area: directives and regulations. The former require national
implementing legislation, while
the latter are directly enforceable.
In the Nordic states and other
countries in Northern Europe,
there is generally compliance by
the countries in the issuance of
laws to implement EU directives.
Indeed, in the Nordic countries,
there are often environmental requirements that exceed those imposed by the EU.
In other parts of Europe, particularly in the southern countries
and the areas formerly under Soviet control (including East Germany), many environmental requirements are either not in place or are
not being enforced aggressively.
The variation among the countries is possible because the European Union’s legal structures and
processes provide far less compliance assurance than in the United
States. The distance between what
is nominally required in the EU
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and what is actually imposed on
the ground can be very large. Even
when there is commitment by a
member state to an environmental
requirement, it is relatively free to
make exceptions and otherwise
minimize the adverse economic
effects that full compliance would
cause.
A case in point is the Kyoto Protocol for the control of greenhouse
gases. If the U.S. were a signatory, there would be facility-speciﬁc quantitative emission limits,
backed up by operating permits
(and perhaps new source permits).
Continuous emissions monitoring
would probably be required. Very
importantly, the government could
not weaken or defer the requirements for some facilities because
of the transparency of our system, public participation, and the
potential for citizen suits both to
compel strict implementation and
to enforce emission limits directly.
The European Commission has
itself often found compliance by
member countries severely wanting. In the EU, countries often ﬁrst
must be made to comply, then that
compliance must ﬂow through to a
facility or even an entire industrial
sector. That is in reality more of a
political than a legal process. In
some countries, the national commitment to compliance is questionable, so compliance by their
industries, let alone individual
facilities, has to be doubted.
In most EU countries, there
is little transparency and no authority for citizen suits. National
authorities can and do make exceptions, relax or defer requirements, or simply fail to look for
violations. This allows Europe to
set loftier goals in its laws because
costs and feasibility can be addressed in the implementation
process.
In the case of materials controls
(such as the Toxic Substances
Control Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act), the comparison would be
to the EU’s forthcoming omnibus
chemical management regulation,
REACH. REACH will unquestionably be more stringent than TSCA.

TSCA, particularly as it applies
to existing chemicals, is roundly
criticized. But much of what such
a chemical control law would be
expected to accomplish is, in the
U.S., accomplished by voluntary
action, albeit often because of the
prospect of product liability. In Europe, product liability is not nearly
the threat that it is in the U.S. and
chemical control varies widely
from one country to another.
The EU’s ability or willingness
to implement REACH as written is
yet to be proved. Most importantly, the EU’s processes will allow
the regulation to be implemented
selectively so that some sort of
compliance will be feasible.
Europe’s environmental laws
are often characterized as aspirational. Members of the EU do
pursue the goals of their laws
(mostly), but the letter of the law
is applied with great ﬂexibility.
If, as in the U.S., the EU had our
regulatory processes, our citizen
suit authority, and our product
liability system, the nominal stringency of its laws would have to be
revisited. In the U.S., compliance
with our laws is much closer to
nominal. What is promised to the
public is, for the most part, delivered. Our laws may in some cases
appear to be less stringent, but the
protection the environment gets is
often better.
Ernie Rosenberg is President and
Chief Executive Ofﬁcer of the Soap
and Detergent Association in Washington, D.C..
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A Pattern Of
Parity And
Particularity
JONATHAN B. WIENER

I

s Europe now ahead of the
United States in environmental
protection? The answer is that a
simplistic sports metaphor cannot
do justice to the complex reality of
transatlantic risk regulation.
It is certainly true that in recent years several highly visible
European policies have been
more precautionary than their
U.S. counterparts — earlier in
anticipation of emerging risks, or
more stringent, or both. Among
these are European Union policies
restricting hormones in beef and
genetically modiﬁed foods, regulating greenhouse gases, and the
new REACH chemicals program.
In each of these cases, the United
States has demurred. Moreover,
Europe has formally adopted the
precautionary principle in its treaties and national laws, while the
U.S. has not.
Based on this evidence that
Europe is “ahead,” some observers
laud European leadership while
others criticize European overregulation. Analysts seek to explain
the alleged pattern as the result of
underlying culture — European
risk-aversion versus American
risk-taking — or, by contrast, as
the result of a reversal in position
from greater U.S. precaution in the
1970s to greater European precaution today. The reversal hypothesis
highlights the slowdown in new
lawmaking in the U.S. Congress,
and the accretion of EU regulatory
institutions, since 1990.
But this evidence of greater
European precaution, drawn from
a few visible policies, is not the
whole story. Other cases point in
the opposite direction, of greater
relative U.S. precaution. For example, the U.S. began phasing out
CFCs a decade before Europe, and
years before observations con5 2
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ﬁrmed the theoretical link to ozone
depletion. The U.S. also phased
out lead in gasoline before Europe
did. Precaution is espoused in key
U.S. statutes, including the Clean
Air Act and the Endangered Species Act. The U.S. adopted earlier
and more stringent restrictions on
ﬁne particulate matter and diesel
emissions, in both the Clinton and
current Bush administrations. In
response to the European epidemic of mad cow disease, the U.S.
has banned British beef since 1989,
whereas the EU did not do so until
1996, and then removed that ban
three years later. Further, in 1999
and 2001 the U.S. FDA adopted
“Precautionary Measures” banning blood donations by people
who have spent a few months in
Britain or a few years in Europe
since 1980 — earlier and far stricter than in Europe, despite little
evidence of mad cow transmission
via blood, and despite the countervailing risk of hospital blood
shortages.
Thus the cases point both ways.
But these competing cases are not
an adequate basis for overall comparisons. Cherry-picking selective
examples does not support conclusions about the general pattern.
Hasty comparisons are vulnerable
to the heuristic errors of paying
disproportionate attention to recent, highly visible events, and
exaggerated distinctions between
groups that are actually similar.
To overcome these limitations,
we undertook a multi-year study
of a broadly representative sample. We identiﬁed the 2,878 risks
mentioned in the relevant literature in the U.S. and Europe from
1970-2004. From this universe,
we selected a random sample of
100 risks and scored the relative
precaution in U.S. and European
regulations for each over the past
35 years. As reported in the article
by Hammitt, Wiener, Swedlow,
Kall & Zhang in Risk Analysis,
October 2005, we found less than
a 6 percent difference in average
relative precaution over the period. Neither the cultural nor the
reversal hypothesis was supported
by the data.
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The real pattern, then, is not the
precautionary principle, it is precautionary particularity. Our broad
analysis reveals that the U.S. and
Europe exhibit general transatlantic parity, punctuated by divergences on a few speciﬁc risks, with
each side acting more aggressively
in some cases. The interesting
question is not who is ahead, but
why the U.S. and EU sometimes
select such different worries.
The EU is now moderating its
commitment to precaution, in
favor of greater emphasis on the
“proportionality principle” and
the concomitant treaty requirement to assess “the potential beneﬁts and costs of action or lack of
action.” In February 2000, the European Commission reclaimed the
precautionary principle as part of
decision analysis, requiring it to be
based on scientiﬁc risk assessment
and beneﬁt-cost analysis. The EU’s
initiative on policy Impact Assessment, launched in 2001, was
reinforced with revised guidelines
issued in 2005 by the new Barroso
Commission. The result is that EU
policy is now converging toward
the same analytic tools used in the
U.S. to evaluate new regulations.
And the legal context, such as
tougher U.S. enforcement and tort
liability, may narrow any asymmetry in regulatory standards.
Risk regulation is a multifaceted
terrain on which no single race is
being run. Rather than debating
who is ahead, we should be learning from policy experimentation,
evaluation, and borrowing. We
should be identifying better laws,
not just more laws. Instead of a
race to the top, the United States
and the EU should be developing
a transatlantic policy laboratory.
Jonathan B. Wiener is Perkins
Professor of Law and Environmental
Policy at Duke University, a University Fellow at Resources for the Future, and visiting professor at EHESS
and CIRED in Paris.

